In 2002, the German government tried to increase private old-age provisions by introducing incentives such as supplementary subsidies and tax credits. Since then, the so-called "Riester pension" has grown in popularity. Apart from subsidized pension plans, unsubsidized private pension insurances as an instrument for old-age have been enormously important for a long time. With data for the years 2005 to 2009 from the German SAVE study, we analyze whether the decision for a "Riester pension" is independent of the decision for unsubsidized private pension insurance using methods for simultaneous equations. Our estimation results indicate that decisions on "Riester" and private pensions are not independent and the proposed random-parameters bivariate probit model results in efficiency gains compared to single probit estimations. Regarding governmental subsidies, we find positive incentive effects of child subsidies whereas low income earners are not induced to increase their old-age provisions. Further, there is strong evidence for a "crowding-in" among alternative assets as well as a significant effect of demand inducement. Finally, considering the saving motives, individuals do not take a "Riester pension" because of securing pension payments only but to pick up granted subsidies.
Introduction
Major financing problems of the public pay-as-you-go pension system are caused by the demographic change. Therefore, keeping up a pay-as-you-go system is contingent upon the development of the working to non-working or old-age dependency ratio. These proportions are influenced by the birth rate, life-expectancy as well as the level of migration. Decreasing birth-rates and an increasing life-span result in a larger proportion of elderly people in the population which has to be financed by a decreasing number of younger people. Hence, Germany among many other countries has implemented pension reforms reducing the overall pension level (reform in 2001) and raising the statutory retirement age (reform in 2005) . Especially the first change will lead to significant lower old-age income which may not ensure the current standard of living. By introducing incentives the German government tried to increase private old-age provisions. In 2002, the so-called "Riester pension" 1 was introduced to foster the voluntary retirement arrangements by supplementary allowances and tax credits by the state. Since then the "Riester pension" has grown in popularity. Today, about 13 million contracts are registered. Many studies (e.g. Corneo et al. 2009 and Börsch-Supan et al. 2008b; Coppola and Reil-Held 2009 ) analyze how these subsidies work.
They focus on the determinants influencing the uptake of a "Riester pension". For example, do younger individuals join the subsidized new pension scheme more frequently than the elderly, or whether private savings are crowded out through the heavily subsidized "Riester pension". In contrast to this, traditional private pension insurance is less regulated by the government and hence offers higher flexibility concerning the payment of the insurance benefit. Moreover, only 50 % of the revenues are taxed.
The aim of this paper is to assess possible determinants of the uptake of private pensions. Therefore, we study the relation between subsidized "Riester pensions" and unsubsidized private pension schemes. The main research question addressed by this paper focuses on the governmental subsidies and whether these subsidies incentivize special forms of private pension schemes. More specifically, we consider if the determinants of the uptake of both forms of private pensions -e.g. socioeconomic and financial factors -point into the same direction. Moreover, we investigate whether the uptake of a private pension scheme is influenced by insurance agents, i.e. are there any demand inducement effects fostering the signing of a special group of contracts. Finally, we analyze whether public allowance accelerates the signing of subsidized pension schemes and the effects on unsubsidized contracts.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by revisiting the relationship between subsidized and unsubsidized pension schemes using German panel data (SAVE study) . Thereby, we fill the gap of former studies that rely on cross-section data and thus neglect any time effects as well as the influence of unobserved heterogeneity. Using methods for simultaneous equations, we analyze whether the decision for a "Riester pension" is independent of the decision for unsubsidized private pension insurance. In addition to former studies also using the SAVE survey, we take advantage of a broader set of explanatory factors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two describes the German old-age pension scheme and gives a brief introduction into the subsidized private "Riester-pension". The next section gives an overview of the related empirical literature dealing with the incentive effects of subsidized private pension schemes. In the following chapter, we describe the dataset and discuss the empirical methodology followed by the presentation of the results in chapter five. Section six finally concludes the findings.
The German pension scheme
For the following analysis it is crucial to give a brief description of the German old-age pension scheme. Today, the old-age provision consists of three independent pillars differing in financing and organization from each other. Generally the three pillars are: the public pay-as-you-go system, occupational pension schemes and private old-age provision. 2 The public first pillar is still the most important institution to prevent poverty and ensure the standard of living after retiring. 80 percent of the working population today is covered by the statutory pension insurance at the same time over 89 percent of the retirees receive a pension (BMAS 2008, p. 12) . However, the pay-as-you-go system is exposed to major financing problems caused by the demographic change. Two trends are the major causes of population ageing: first, increasing life expectancy and second, a decreasing fertility. Therefore, the German government began to reform the public system to the end that the system will be stabilized and financeable for future generations. As a result the overall pension level (reform in 2001) will be reduced and the statutory retirement age (reform in 2005) will increase from 65 up to 67 years. The 2001 reform will lead to a significant lower old-age income in future which may not ensure the current standard of living. By introducing incentives the German government tried to increase old-age provisions to compensate for these future cuts in public pensions (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2004). First, individuals may convert part of their salary into contributions to pension plans (second pillar). This is promoted by the government through tax deferrals and exemption from social security contributions. Second, individuals may choose to invest in private old-age provision to close the pension gap.
Private old-age provision: subsidized and unsubsidized pension schemes
One of the major goals of the 2001 pension reform in Germany was to prompt especially low-income earners to make provision for old-age as they are extremely affected by the reduction of the overall pension level. "Riester pension" products are promoted through fixed supplements and tax advantages by the State (see BMAS 2009 and Wilke 2004) . 3 People are entitled to "Riester pension plans" if they are directly affected by the 2001 pension reform and are still actively insured in the respective pension schemes. Moreover, spouses without direct entitlement are indirectly entitled if their partner is direct eligibile. Not eligible are self-employed people not mandatorily insured in the public system, students as well as low-income earners (up to 400 € per month). To qualify for subsidies, the personal contribution including the governmental subsides must account for at least 4% of the individual's yearly gross income. If the contributions to a "Riester" contract are lower, the subsidies are reduced proportionally. Moreover, higher subsidies directly lower the personal net-contribution. 4 Since the introduction, financial support has been increased in four steps. From 2008 on, the "Riester pension" has reached its highest level of public assistance. The basic benefit is now € 154 and the child subsidy is € 185 per year for each child for whom the beneficiary receives child benefit. For children born from 2008 onwards, the child supplement is € 300. In addition, the retirement pension contributions (taking into account the supplement) up to € 2,100 can be offset as additional special expenditure against tax. By construction of the German income tax system, tax expenditures are favorable for higher incomes. Overall, the official statistic of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2010) suggest a strongly increasing uptake of subsidized "Riester-pensions". Until the end of 2009 more than 13 million "Riester" contracts were signed. Since a modification of the "Riester-pension" in the year 2005 simplified the application procedure and reduced the complexity, demand for a subsidized old-age provision has increased.
Apart from subsidized pension plans, private pension insurances are popular instruments for old-age provision. In addition, cash-value life insurance as an instrument for old-age and survivor provision has been tremendously important for a long time. Both forms differ with respect to taxation of revenues and the inclusion of the event of death. For cash-value life insurance this means that the inclusion of the risk of death lead to a higher risk component in relation to the savings component.
Thus, individuals have to fill out a health questionnaire prior to the signing to determine their relative risk. Regarding the taxation of private old-age provision, revenues from a "Riester" contract are fully taxed whereas revenue from a private pension insurance are only taxed up to 18 %. To sum up, "Riester" pensions and traditional private pension schemes are comparable investments but differ with respect to subsidization, flexibility and taxation. Hence, it is interesting to analyze whether the demand for these two forms of old-age provisions is due to differences in the regulatory framework.
Literature Review
For the purpose of this analysis the literature on the determinants of private old-age provision can be classified into two strands. One strand emphasizes the uptake of a subsidized ("Riester-pension").
The focus of another strand is on signing alternative unsubsidized private pension insurance.
The "Riester-pension" is considered as publicly subsidized private old-age provision in the related literature. These subsidies trigger a substitution effect as well as an income effect in the way that the substitution effect deflects unsubsidized savings in subsidized ones. 5 By contrast the income effect displaces private savings in the amount of the public allowances (cf. Blankart 2008) . Thus, Prinz et al. (2003) focus on the effects induced by the public allowances on the choice behavior of private households using a microeconomic analysis. They show that public subsidies -in a two period framework -increase the current consumption and therefore displace private savings.
Major research concentrates on the substitution effect based on the "Riester-pension". Corneo et al. (2009; analyze the propensity to save of low-income private households in Germany. The data used in their analysis are the German Socioeconomic Panel 6 as well as the German SAVE study. 7 The results of the first study indicate that governmental subsidies neither have a significant effect on the propensity to save of private households nor increase the proportion of saving households within low-income groups. Continuing research in their 2010 study focuses on a broader definition of the sample confirming their first findings. According to this, private households marginally react to the subsidy incentives of the "Riester-pension" by increasing their private old-age provision. The authors conclude that taking up "Riester-pension" substitutes other forms of savings.
Furthermore, Börsch-Supan et al. (2007) give additional evidence for the existence of a substitution effect. Using cross-section data from the German SAVE study for 2005 the authors investigate the determinants fostering the uptake of a subsidized "Riester-pension". They find that public subsidies are a main reason for saving and therefore affect the uptake of a "Riester-pension" significantly positive. Another result is rested on socioeconomic factors. Younger individuals and those with 5 This substitution effect is commonly referred to as "crowding in" (cf. Börsch-Supan et al. 2008b; Corneo et al. 2010) . 6 The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual representative panel survey starting in 1984. 7 The SAVE study started in 2001 and is a representative longitudinal household survey on households' financial behavior focusing on the saving decisions and old-age provisions. The survey is conducted by the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA). For further information see Börsch-Supan et al. (2007; 2008a) . children sign a "Riester-pension" more likely. In addition, the lowest income quintile has a significant negative effect on the probability to own a "Riester-pension". The analysis of Coppola and Reil-Held (2009) provides related results using more recent data. The findings also substantiate the negative income effect. Thus, households of the lowest income quintile sign significantly less often a "Riester" contract than those of the middle income quintile.
Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the year 2007, Geyer and Steiner (2009) analyze whether low-income households are more likely to sign a "Riester-pension" than higher incomes. The results are in line with Börsch-Supan et al. (2007) and Coppola and Reil-Held (2009) suggesting that the political goal has not been achieved up to now. According to this, individuals with a yearly gross income less than 10,000 euro infrequently have a "Riester-pension" available than higher incomes. Also using cross-section data from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the year 2007, Lampig and Tepe (2009) study the determinants of old-age provision taking alternative savings as explanatory factors into account. A first result is that individuals holding more than one investment have a significant higher probability to own a "Riester" contract. In contrast to other studies, the authors provide evidence that woman are likelier to take up a "Riester-pension" than men.
In contrast to previous studies Pfarr and Schneider (2011) use panel data for the years 2004, 2006 and 2007 from the German Socioeconomic Panel to explore whether publicly subsidized savings are driven by the incentives of child benefits and if supplier induced demand is an important factor. The authors find evidence that individuals have a higher probability to sign a "Riester" contract if they are in a higher income quintile; do have higher education and more children. They show that a contact with an insurance agent in the previous year is one major factor for the uptake of a "Riesterpension". Moreover, their results indicate differences regarding gender and socialization.
To sum up the findings of the first strand of literature concerning the uptake of a "Riester-pension", there exists evidence that subsidizing private old-age provision has lead low-income earner neither to prevent more for old-age nor to increase the propensity to save of private households. Moreover, individuals indicating public subsidies as a main reason for savings more often join a "Riestercontract". These results suggest, that private households substitute unsubsidized savings through subsidized ones. In addition, the studies suggest that the incentives of child-related benefits are an important factor.
The second strand of the literature intent to highlight determinants fostering the uptake of unsubsidized private pension insurance. Schulte and Zirpel (2010) concentrate on adverse selection in the determinants of private pension insurance uptake in Germany using data from the German SAVE study for the year 2005. The results show, that subjective life-expectancy is positively related with the probability of signing private pension insurance. Thus, individuals have rational expectations of their life-expectancy when deciding to make provisions for old-age in form of private pension insurance. In addition, the findings show a significant negative effect of the number of children which can be interpreted as a form of altruism. In the second part of their study Börsch-Supan et al. (2007) investigate the factors of signing private pension insurance contracts. Also with data from the German SAVE study for the year 2005 they show that the number of children as well as to be in the two lowest income quintiles is negatively related with the probability of having a private pension insurance. Furthermore, a variable regarding old-age as saving motive shows a significant positive coefficient. The authors summarize that the expressed attitudes correspond with current behavior.
Finally, there is one study similar to our approach. Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b) focus on the impact of household characteristics on the uptake of either subsidized "Riester-pension" or unsubsidized private pension insurance. 8 The decision to enroll in one of the both forms of old-age provision is modeled simultaneously. Using data for 2005 from the German SAVE study the results suggest that the most important factor determining the uptake of a "Riester-pension" is the categorical variable number of children. However, this effect does not exist for taking up unsubsidized pension insurances. Furthermore, income is only relevant for the decision on private pension insurance. The authors also control for different saving motives. They find a significant positive coefficient for public subsidies as reason for saving. This effect cannot be found in the decision making process for an unsubsidized private pension insurance. Alternative forms of savings are captured in one variable containing for instance occupational pension schemes or life-insurance contracts. This variable has a highly significant positive effect on the probability of signing a "Riester" contract as well as private pension insurance. In both cases the magnitude of the effect is similar. The authors conclude that households use different approaches to make provisions for old-age resulting in a "crowding-in" among private pension products.
As a shortcoming, all the presented studies except of Pfarr and Schneider (2011) rely on cross-section data and therefore omit the possibility to control for time effects and unobserved heterogeneity through the application of panel data models. In addition, there is no study combining socioeconomic factors with saving motives, alternative investments, and the effect of demand inducement as well as adverse selection all together in one approach.
We aim at filling this gap by revisiting the relationship between subsidized and unsubsidized pension schemes using German panel data (SAVE study). Using a simultaneous equations approach, we analyze the dependence of the decisions for a "Riester pension" and for unsubsidized private pension 8 Börsch-Supan et al. use a bivariate probit model for analyzing the dependency between the uptake of "Riester pensions" and private pension insurance. Nevertheless, the correlation between the simultaneously modeled probit regressions is not statistically significant.
insurance. Our main advantage to former studies also using the SAVE survey is that we take advantage of a broader set of explanatory factors and use data for several years to capture effects over time.
Data and Methods
For the following analysis, we use data from the representative German SAVE study, which is For the study at hand, we restrict our dataset to those individuals eligible for a "Riester pension". We run a regression for two binary dependent variables Riester and private pension on socioeconomic, financial and saving motives variables using an unbalanced panel structure. A full description of the variables is presented in Table 1 .
To cover nonlinear age effects and to avoid an arbitrary definition of age categories, we apply age quintiles for our analysis. The reference is age quintile one consisting of those individuals aged 31 or younger. To control for adverse selection in the private pension market we additional take the subjective life-expectancy into account. The variable Rest life reflects the years between the stated life-expectancy in the survey and the current age. The interpretation is as follows: a higher value of Especially in terms of the subsidized "Riester-pension" the child-related subsidies should positively affect the probability to sign a "Riester" contract. In contrast, the literature indicates that the number of children has a negative impact on owning private pension insurance. Income is included as five income categories using the equivalent monthly net household income. The reference category is the 100 to 150 % interval of median income. With respect to the literature, we predict a negative impact of the lowest income category on the uptake of a "Riester-pension". The same is true for private pension insurance. Moreover, the effects of income on taking up a subsidized or unsubsidized old-age provision are highly relevant. To assess the impact of alternative savings, in a second specification, additional information on building loan contracts, cash-value life insurances, accumulation plans, real estate ownership and stock ownership are included. We assume that individuals or households use several instruments to provide for old-age. Therefore, the coefficient of these alternative savings should have a positive sign.
Moreover, demand for financial advice and strength of financial compliance are considered as explanatory factors. We hypothesize that individuals visiting an advisor are more likely to sign a "Riester" contract or private pension insurance than others. In addition, we also take into account an interaction between financial advice and the strength of financial compliance to control for a possible demand inducement. The appeal of "Riester" products for the financial industry in Germany is obvious. Through the complexity of "Riester-pension" products competition between various providers is minimized. Thus, the insurance commissions as well as the marketing costs for "Riester" products are relatively high. As a result, the active marketing of "Riester-pensions" may result in demand inducement.
Finally, saving motives are covered through two binary variables. The first, Saving motive: old age is assumed to positively influence the probability of both, "Riester-pension" and private pension insurance. The second, Saving motive: subsidies is included to check whether respondents confirm with their behavior.
The summary statistics are presented in Table 2 to 4 % of those with one visit claim to be compliance with the advice. The demand for insurance may also depend on the risk aversion of the respondent. In our data, more than 78 % are not willing to take financial risks. The major reason for saving is to provide for old-age, whereas state subsidies are only relevant for about 26 % of the respondents. 10 The table contains information on the first imputation. The four other imputed data sets differ only slightly and are available upon request. 
Estimation approach
To analyze the decision about subsidized and unsubsidized private pensions, we use an empirical model for simultaneous equations. The advantage of this procedure is that we are able to estimate two equations that seem to be independent at first view. Moreover, there might be a correlation between them due to the structure of the errors. Firstly, to examine the relationship between the two binary variables Riester and private pension, Table 3 present the cross tabulation as well as the tetrachoric correlation. Thus, 446 people owning a "Riester-pension" already are holding private pension insurance whereas 4,150 people have neither. Here y 1 and y 2 are binary dependent variables and y* their latent counterpart. The parameter ρ reflects the covariance between the two error terms. In other words, ρ measures the impact of unobserved factors on the probability to own a "Riester-pension" or private pension insurance. Both equations (4.1) can be estimated consistently as single equation probit models. However, this might be inefficient as it ignores the correlation between the disturbances (cf. Greene and Hensher 2010) .
Therefore, the correlation coefficient might be of interest. If ρ is statistically different from zero -that means that the error terms ε 1 and ε 2 are not independent -then the above model should not be estimated as two independent equations (cf. Maddala 1983, p. 123) . Thus, equation (4.1) forms a simultaneous equation system. 11 We apply a bivariate probit model to estimate the equations above.
To start with, the joint probability of an outcome 12 1 yy  can be written in terms of the conditional and marginal probabilities as: The remaining probabilities are then: 
(4.5) 11 It is also possible to consider a potential endogeneity of the dependent variables. If we specify the model with a mutual influence of both dependent variables, Maddala (1983, p. 117 f.) shows that this model would not be consistent or estimable. One solution would be to calculate the probabilities for two binary dependent variables where only one dependent variable enters the second equation as explanatory factor resulting in a recursive bivariate probit model (cf. Maddala 1983) . Nevertheless, this would require some theoretical advice on the dependency of each decision to take up a "Riester-pension" or a private pension insurance.
These are the probabilities that enter the likelihood function for the bivariate probit model (cf. Greene 1998, p. 295) .
With respect to the panel structure, it is important how to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. For the bivariate probit model for panel data, we use a generalization of a random effects model proposed by Greene. Since the implementation of random effects for a bivariate probit model is nontrivial, our approach applies to a random parameters method (Greene 2001) . According to this approach, the advantage is that all variables -including the constant term -can be treated as random. In our specific case, we use a specification where only the constant terms of the two equations are assumed to be randomly distributed. In effect, this implementation of a random parameters model is equivalent to a random effects bivariate probit model for panel data.
The general specification of a random parameters model for binary choice rests upon the following conditional probability:
with   F  as the normal distribution. The underlying specification of the vector of coefficients is:
where β is the vector of unconditional means. Furthermore, ∆ is a matrix of unknown location parameters, i z is a vector of individual characteristics (heterogeneity term),  a matrix of unknown variance parameters and i v the vector of random latent individual effects, with zero mean. In the general random parameters model, it is assumed parameters are randomly distributed across individuals with possibly heterogeneous mean and variance:
The second term is optional meaning that the parameter matrix 0  . In this case and conditional that the coefficient i  is constant, the parameter in view is non-random. In our application of a bivariate probit model, we assume that all parameters other than the constant terms in both equations are non-random. According to this, the random parameters model is equivalent to the following random effects specification: 1  1   2  2 2  2  2   1  2  2   1  2  2 , , , ,~ 0,0,1,1, , 1 1 ,~ 0,0,1,1, , 1 1 Second, heterogeneity between the true disturbances itj  . In our case, a random effects model is applied using Limdep. Instead of random draws we use the Halton sequence for the simulated maximum likelihood to reduce the number of draws and computation time.
Obtaining results from multiple imputed datasets
The estimation with different imputations requires some caution with respect to the 'averaging' of the results (see Little and Rubin 2002, p. 86) 
  5 Results
Our estimation results for both restricted and full specification indicate that decisions on "Riester" and private pensions are not independent and the proposed random-parameters bivariate probit model results in efficiency gains compared to single probit estimations. The correlation of the residuals ρ is significantly positive meaning that unobservable factors have a positive influence on the likelihood to sign subsidized and unsubsidized private pensions.
In detail, we observe differences in the magnitude of the coefficient and the corresponding level of significance between both equations. For the restricted model (see Table 4 ) -which does not incorporate financial variables -we find a highly significant and positive time gradient for Riester whereas only one year is relevant for private pension insurance. Further differences occur regarding age quintiles and the number of children. The probability for a "Riester contract" increases for the second and third age quintile but decreases for the highest quintile. For private pensions, only the second quintile shows a significantly positive effect. According to this, younger individuals have recognized future cuts of public pensions and have begun to make private provisions for old-age.
Subjective years to life (Rest life) show a significant and positive effect only for "Riester pensions".
The interpretation is as follows: individual reporting a higher rest life span tend to sign a subsidized pension more likely. In contrast to the literature, where Schulte and Zirpel (2010) find evidence of adverse selection in the decision making process for private pension insurance, our results suggest that adverse selection is only relevant for the uptake of "Riester".
As the subsidies rise with the number of children, we find a strong and positive gradient for the "Riester-pension". Thus, the public incentives to take up a subsidized pension are working well. On contrary, the number of children is insignificant or even negative for the probability of a private pension. These reverse effects can be explained by recalling how the subsidies work. The combination of subsidy and personal contribution must account for at least 4 % of the individual's yearly gross income to be eligible for the subsidies in the first place; the higher the subsidies the lower the personal contribution. This means that each additional child helps to reduce the personal contribution down to the lower limit of 60 € per year. Once the minimum personal contribution of 60 € is reached, any additional subsidy increases the personal saving rate. This results in a considerable "leverage effect". The observed results for children regarding subsidized "Riesterpension" are consistent with these incentives. On the other side, unsubsidized pension, which does not provide an additional child benefit, is less often chosen by households with more than one child.
With a look at income variables, we find a significantly negative coefficient for those relatively poor in both equations. Instead, higher income and relative wealth positively influence the take up only for private pension schemes; for Riester contracts, no significant effects can be found. These findings indicate that political aims to induce higher old-age provisions of low income earners are not achieved. Subsidization thus has no effect and the incentives for low income groups failed to work.
The employment effects are as expected: those full employed have a significantly higher likelihood to own a private pension while those in part-time employment use public subsidies and tend to have "Riester-pensions". Regarding our full model (see Table 5 ), including financial variables changes the effects of children and education. While in the restricted model, some of the educational variables show a significantly positive impact this effect cannot be found in the full specification. This result emphasizes the role of financial literacy. In the restricted model, these effects are possibly covered by the educational variables whereas in the full specification, financial assets and financial behavior have more relevance for the addressed question. The number of children has now a more negative impact on traditional private pensions. The magnitude of income effects decreased and for private pension insurance, higher income is no insignificant. The reason behind this can be seen in the inclusion of various financial variables. While in the restricted model, income is the only indicator regarding earnings and wealth whereas now assets are explicitly included.
Alternative investments positively affect the uptake of both forms of provisions. It is interesting that other government-promoted investments (such as building loan contracts) are only relevant for the "Riester" decision indicating an affinity to state allowances. With exemption of home ownership, the positive effects of other assets can be viewed as "crowding in" among alternative investments.
Hence, individuals use various forms of assets to make provisions for old-age. Those individuals who make use of financial advice are more likely to sign either form of pension. More interestingly, the interaction between advice and strong financial compliance is only relevant for "Riester". It seems that financial intermediates have an incentive to promote the highly regulated "Riester pension". The complexity of these products limits competition between various providers. High insurance commissions and marketing costs strengthen the incentives resulting in active marketing of "Riesterpensions". This indicates that financial consultants play an important role in the decision making process that may result in a significant demand inducement.
The advantageous tax rules for private pension schemes are present by the significant positive coefficient of tax advisor. On contrary, tax expenditures for "Riester pensions" are limited and only favorable for high income groups. Saving motives play an important role for the old-age provision.
Respondents stating to save for old age significantly own both forms of pensions. However, a closer look shows that the effect for private pension insurance is twice the effect for "Riester". While the reason for this is unclear at first, taking into account subsidies as a saving motive sheds light on the investment decision. As expected, we find no effect of this motive for private pensions. Instead, the highly significant effect for "Riester pensions" indicates the importance of public subsidies.
Comparing the magnitude of the saving motives' coefficients lets us conclude that the subsidies motive dominates the old-age motive. Thus, people do not take a "Riester pension" because of securing pension payments only but to pick up granted subsidies.
Finally, concerning our estimation approach, the correlation between the error terms of the two equations is highly significant positive. This means that the decisions on "Riester" and private pension insurance are not independent and therefore, separate estimations lead to a loss in efficiency. However, the correlation decreases by including financial variables but remains significant. 
Summary
Regarding our research questions, our results confirm that governmental subsidies have positive incentive effects for private pension schemes. This is evident for the child allowances for the Riester pension. This means that each additional child helps to reduce the personal contribution down to the minimum limit. On contrary, the effect of children is negative for private pension insurance. Income effects are broadly discussed in the literature -with mixed results. For both forms of provision, we find a negative effect for those relatively poor. According to this the political aims to induce higher old-age provisions of low income earners are not achieved. Subsidization thus has no effect and the incentives for low income groups failed to work. Moreover, it is interesting to notice that not all explanatory factors influence the dependent variables in the same way. For instance, we find differences for age, number of children and the strength of financial compliance.
Alternative investments seem to have an important impact on old-age provision. Thus, individuals use various forms of assets to ensure their current standard of living in future. These effects can be interpreted as "crowding in" among alternative investments. The question whether the uptake of private pensions is influenced by insurance agents can be confirmed. Indeed, demand inducement can be found for the subsidized "Riester pension" but not for traditional private pensions. Financial intermediates then have an incentive to promote the highly regulated "Riester pension". Taking into account that we find no effects of education, the influence of financial intermediates challenges possible effects of improving financial literacy. In addition, saving motives play an important role for the old-age provision. In the decision making process to take up a "Riester pension", granting subsidies dominate the old-age motive.
Generally, regarding the future gap in the public pension system, any increase in private old-age arrangements seems to be positive. But it remains unclear whether the higher demand for "Riester pensions" in fact increases the private savings rate or whether we observe a substitution of unsubsidized through subsidized products. Finally, our empirical findings emphasize the relationship between different forms of private provision for old-age. Further research should analyze if individuals take the full choice set of different investments into account or if governmental subsidies distort competition between these alternatives.
